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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS WITH
ALICE AND LARRY: THE NATURE OF
SCHOLARSHIP
MARJORIE

E. KORNHAUSER*

Oliver Wendell Holmes once said that taxes are the price of

civilization;' they are also the story of civilization, or rather the

stories of civilization. For example, taxes trace the history of wars,2
and even explain some of our physical surroundings by their effects
on architecture.3 Taxes also tell us more generally about our society
since what we tax and how we tax reflect a multitude of
philosophical, social, and political choices. Some of these tax stories
have long been known even if we sometimes ignore or forget them
due to our concern for the technical aspects of revenue raising and
the heavy emphasis on economic efficiency.4 Recently, however,
more tax scholars have been looking at the non-technical sides of tax
© 1998 Marjorie E. Kornhauser.
* Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. I would like to thank Professors Jeanne
Carriere, Lynne Henderson, Mary Louise Fellows, Lewis Kornhauser, and John Stick for
their comments on prior versions of this Article.
1. See Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275
U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J.) ("Taxes are what we pay for civilized society.").
2. For example, the need for revenues to finance the war against Napoleon led to
the enactment of an income tax in Austria, Great Britian, and Holland. See CAROLYN
WEBBER & AARON WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE
WESTERN WORLD 337-38 (1986). Similarly, in the United States an income tax was first
suggested in 1815 to finance the War of 1812 and first enacted during the Civil War to
meet the war's revenue needs. See EDwIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 430-40
(1911).
3. Windows, rooms, and indoor staircases have all been the subject of taxes at one
time or another, resulting in windowless rooms, closetless houses, and staircases on the
outside only. See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser & Becky Bair Hurley, Saving God's Republic:
The Jurisprudence of Samuel Chase, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 771, 802 n.175 (citing a
Pennsylvania woman who poured "scalding water over the tax inspector who came to
count her windows in order to fix the amount of the house tax"). Only the imagination
limits what can (and has been) taxed. England, for example, taxed bachelors. See An Act
for Granting to His Majesty Certaine Rates and Duties upon Marriages Births and
Burials and upon Batchelors and Widowers for the Terme of Five Yeares for Carrying on
the Warr Against France with Vigour, 1695, 6 & 7 W. & M., ch. 6, § 7, reprintedin VI THE
STATUTES OF THE REALM 568, 573 (prtg. 1963) (1819).
4. Examples of these tax stories include the story of the change in the tax base (to a
consumption tax) and the story of the taxable unit.
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and looking at them from different points of view. As they do so,
they discover new stories or new interpretations of old stories. This
is what feminist and critical race scholars are doing in "critical tax
theory."5
Critical scholarship is relatively new to the tax field, but it has
existed in other legal areas such as torts, contracts, and constitutional
law for some time. Initially it was resisted, ignored, dismissed, or
trivialized, but today critical scholarship can be found in the top
journals. Scholars such as Patricia Cain and Richard Delgado,
however, have noted that this is a sign of only superficial acceptance
by academia. They state that the legal academy often ignores or
trivializes feminist scholarship 6 and has failed to integrate critical
scholars "fully into [its] conversations, colloquies, footnotes, [etc.]." 7
At first glance, then, my receipt of a draft of Professor Lawrence
Zelenak's article Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously8 accompanied
by an offer from the North CarolinaLaw Review to participate in a
symposium on critical tax theory indicates a remarkably early
acceptance of critical tax theory. A second glance, however, reveals a
less sanguine view, one more in keeping with Cain's and Delgado's
descriptions of the reception of critical scholarship in general.
Zelenak's critique calls into question his claim to value this type of

5. In this Article I use the phrase "critical tax theory" to mean feminist and critical
race scholarship because Professor Zelenak does so. I believe, however, that all tax
scholarship, like all scholarship, should be critical in the sense that it should use logic and
rational thought to evaluate a problem. I am a critical scholar in this larger sense but
probably not in the narrow sense Zelenak uses it to mean either a critical race tax scholar
or a feminist tax scholar. I discuss the nature of feminist tax scholarship more generally
in Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Taxing Woman: The Relationship of Feminist Scholarship
to Tax, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 301 (1997).
6. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist LegalScholarship,77 IOWA L. REV. 19,19 (1991).
7. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider
Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (1992). Professor Frances Olsen,
writing for a recent symposium on "Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship," states
that "for the first time, 'outsider' scholarship is being cited with significant frequency."
Frances Olsen, Affirmative Action: Necessary but Not Sufficient, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
937, 937 (1996). She says there are three views, each with some support, regarding the
relationship of these increased citations to the academy's acceptance of outsiders: (1)
increased citations indicate that outsiders have been accepted; (2) increased citations
"foreshadow a change about to occur"; and (3) increased citations do not indicate an
increased acceptance because standards will change and outsiders will remain outsiders.
See id. As evidence of continued marginalization of outsiders, she says that although the
number of women professors in law schools has increased, a disproportionate number of
them teach at less prestigious schools. See id. at 938.
8. Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1521
(1998).
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scholarship.9 Moreover, the Symposium can hardly be viewed as a
conversation among equals when the agenda is set and dominated by

one person, that person devotes a long article to criticizing this mode
of scholarship, and the respondents have only a short space in which

to reply.
Zelenak's article, in fact, reveals a misunderstanding not only of

the articles he critiques and of critical tax theory more generally, but
also of the very nature of scholarship. There can be numerous
explanations for his misconceptions, such as good-faith differences of
opinion, lack of ability to understand, careless reading, Cain's
"gendered misunderstandings,"1

which arise from a failure to

understand conclusions based on the different life experiences of a
person of a different gender, or similarly race-based
misunderstandings. Lack of ability is not Zelenak's problem; rather,
his difficulty seems to stem from all of the other sources."

His

misconceptions are not unique to him, as Professors Cain and
Delgado have indicated.
Moreover, many of the same
misconceptions arise not only in connection with feminist and critical
race scholarship, but with other "outsider" scholarship 2 as well.
Zelenak's article exemplifies a common phenomenon in which
outsider scholarship is critiqued in a manner that leads the author to
wonder whether the commentator has read a different article from
the one she wrote; or at a minimum, if it is the same article, whether

he read it through a looking glass 3 (and darkly at that). The reader,
9. The first draft I received was entirely critical; the second draft I received had a
short section (eight pages) giving a few examples of critical tax articles that are "doing it
right." See id. at 1574-78.
10. Cain, supra note 6, at 33.
11. Gender/race misunderstanding is not only an independent factor, but it also can
encourage careless reading (due to the trivialization factor noted previously) as well as
influence a person's ultimate preferences and opinions. After all, people tend to pay
more attention to and be comfortable with that which is familiar.
12. By "outsider" scholarship I mean scholarship based on theories or views other
than the dominant ones that are represented in the institutions and mores of a society.
Marxism, for example, is an outsider theory in a capitalist world, whereas capitalism
would be an outsider theory in a Marxist society. For a discussion of outsider
jurisprudence, see Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320,2323-26 (1989). Mar Matsuda describes outsiders
as "defying the habit of neutral principles to entrench existing power." Id. at 2325.
13. Zelenak's (mis)reading brings to mind Alice, who went through a looking glass.
There she learned that her familiar world, when seen from a different perspective, was
very strange indeed and full of rules and meanings different from those she had always
taken for granted. In Taking CriticalTax Theory Seriously, Zelenak encounters his tax
world as seen through the looking glass of "critical tax" theory but does not negotiate
through this new world as successfully as Alice, who becomes a queen at the end. See
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE, in
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Zelenak in this case, is so divorced from the author and her text that
the reader can serve as a model for an anarchical deconstructionism
which places few, if any, constraints upon the reader. Surely, all texts
have some ambiguity and must be deconstructed to some extent.
This is not a new idea, just a currently fashionable one. Ambiguity,
however, does not usually lead to anarchy because the reader belongs
to a community whose customs and understandings the reader uses to
narrow the numerous alternative meanings and to interpret the text.14
Problems often arise, however, when the community breaks down or
when a reader from one community encounters the text of an
unfamiliar community.
A century-old example illustrates the ubiquity of ambiguity, the
existence of commonalities-or communities-of understanding
which limit the chaos ambiguity creates, and the expansion of the
chaos as those communities break down:
Suppose a housekeeper says to a domestic: "fetch
some soup-meat" accompanying the act with giving some
money to the latter; he will be unable to execute the order
without interpretation, however easy and, consequently,
rapid the performance of the process may be. Common
sense and good faith tell the domestic, that the
housekeeper's meaning was this: 1. He should go
immediately, or as soon as his other occupations are
finished;... 2. that the money handed him by the
housekeeper is intended to pay for the meat thus ordered,
and not as a present to him; 3. that he should buy such meat
and of such parts of the animal, as to his knowledge, has
commonly been used in the house he stays at, for making
soup; 4. that he buy the best meat he can obtain, for a fair
price; 5. that he go to that butcher who usually provides the
family, with whom the domestic resides, with meat, or to
some convenient stall ... ; 6. that he return the rest of the
money; 7. that he bring home the meat in good faith, neither
adding anything disagreeable nor injurious; 8. that he fetch
the meat for the use of the family and not for himself....
THE ANNOTATED ALICE 317 (Clarkson N. Potter, Inc. 1960) (1871).
14. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, Is There a Text in This Class?, in Is THERE A TEXT IN
TIES CLASS? 303, 303-21 (1980).
15. FRANCIS LEIBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 18 (William G.
Hammond ed., 3d ed. 1880), quoted in MICHAEL ZANDER, THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS
105 (4th ed. 1994). The example Fish uses in Is There a Text in This Class?is a student on
the first day of school who has just finished a class with Professor Fish. See FISH, supra
note 14, at 305. In her next course, the student asks another professor: "'Is there a text
in this class?'" The professor says that the text is the Norton Anthology of Literature,but
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Today's reader understands this passage only imperfectly
because she does not belong to the community which provided the
Contrary to the writer's
underlying customs and meanings.
assumption that the interpretation will be easy, common sense and
good faith do not yield complete understanding. For example,
housekeepers and domestics differ today from those of 100 years ago
in various aspects: function, place in society, and even identity. 6
Few people make homemade soup and therefore most would be
hard-pressed to identify the appropriate quantity or type of meat for
the soup. Nevertheless, today's society is sufficiently similar to
Victorian times that most people could read the passage and
comprehend its general meaning. In fact, the similarities of the two
communities can be dangerous because they can cause the reader not
to notice the differences. Thus, today's domestic (the woman who
comes in to clean one morning a week) may take the money the
housekeeper (the "lady of the house") gives her and use it (minus an
amount she keeps for "gas" money and a "tip" that the housekeeper
forgot to give her) to buy three pounds of prime rib roast at the local
A&P which she delivers the next week she comes to the house. But
even in 1880, not everyone would have given the same interpretations
to the implicit assumptions: the appropriate quantity and quality of
meat to buy varied depending on one's economic status, as did
whether there was a domestic to send for the meat, or even whether
meat was affordable.
There is not, in short, one homogeneous community; there never
was. There are only overlapping communities, each with a different
perspective. Unlike other areas of the law, tax has just begun to
realize that its community consists of various communities and that
underlying assumptions are not as universal as people once thought
(at least the people who wrote the laws).
Zelenak's misreading and numerous misunderstandings result
from his failure to grasp this fact completely when he surveys critical
tax scholarship. He is like Alice who steps through the Looking
Glass into a world so similar to her own but so different because it is
seen from a slightly different perspective. The two worlds are
overlapping communities, and their very similarities cause
misunderstandings. Through the Looking Glass, words lose their

the student replies: "'No, no,... I mean in this class do we believe in poems and things,
or is it just us?'" Id. (quoting a student at Johns Hopkins University).
16. For example, domestics today, whatever their definition, generally are females
and not males; relatively few people have live-in help.
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common meanings and are taken literally, and rules (even basic
ones) turn out to be maddeningly different. The result for Alice is
often a state of confusion and semi-understanding. As she states
after reading the poem Jabberwocky: " 'It seems very pretty ... but
it's rather hard to understand.... Somehow it seems to fill my head
with ideas-only I don't exactly know what they are.' "'9 Zelenak has
a similar response. He likes the general idea of critical theory, but his
comprehension of its meaning is clouded by the assumptions of his
own world. For example, he states that critical tax theory is
important work, but he is "troubled that much of the work has not
been carefully done."2 Yet, he himself has not read carefully the
articles he criticizes. This is especially unfortunate since, as the
housekeeper example shows, an excursion into another similar, but
different, world requires extra care if it is to be properly appreciated
and understood. More generally and importantly, his fundamental
objections to critical tax theory reflect his own failure to understand
completely the multiplicity of communities, the relativity of tax, and
the nature of scholarship.
Zelenak's failure reveals itself in his very reproach of critical tax
theory which he rests on four grounds: (1) "an over-eagerness to
accuse the tax laws of hostility to women or blacks;"'" (2) "a failure to
recognize the diversity within feminist thought;"' (3) "selection bias,
both in the aspects of the tax laws chosen for study, and in the
analysis of those chosen aspects;"'23 and (4) "[t]he most serious
problem is the failure to think through proposed solutions with
17. See Martin Gardner, Annotation to CARROLL, supra note 13, at 280 n.5. This is
perhaps an example of the breakdown in communication that occurs when communities
overlap-they are similar but are seen from a different perspective.
Zelenak
demonstrates this characteristic. See infra notes 39-41. Anyone who has studied a foreign
language knows the difficulty of speaking words when she is not grounded in the culture
that shapes them. This problem also arises in one's native language for children who
frequently know words but take them literally, for example, giving the house a coat of
paint. Some children's literature focuses on this aspect of language cognition. See, for
example, the Amelia Bedelia books about a maid who performs such tasks as drawing the
drapes, dressing the turkey, and dusting the furniture in a literal, but unusual fashion.
See, e.g., PEGGY PARISH, AMELIA BEDELIA (1963).
18. For example, in the Looking Glass, running doesn't get you anywhere: "[I]t takes
all the running you can do to keep in the same place." CARROLL, supra note 13, at 210.
A personal favorite rule of mine is the one that gives you jam every other day: "[J]am tomorrow and jam yesterday-but never jam to-day." Id. at 247. This is a good metaphor
of how laws often apply to powerless groups such as women.
19. Id. at 197.
20. Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1523.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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sufficient care"-"[i]t is unfair to criticize current law for its effects
on women or blacks without showing a way to do better."24 Each of
his objections is itself objectionable.
I. OVEREAGERNESS TO ACCUSE THE TAX LAWS OF HOSTILITY TO
WOMEN OR BLACKS

Most tax scholarship concentrates on economic, technical, or
practical issues of tax. Even articles involving political issues tend to
stress the legislative process rather than more deep-seated issues of
the nature of government and society. However, since the tax laws
are products of a particular time and place,25 they do not represent
Truth-only truth. An important goal of tax scholarship, then, is to
unravel the story about that particular truth-to show that it is only a
story and to reveal its origins and its effects, which may be
unintended. This unraveling can be done in a number of ways, for
example by philosophic or historical examinations.26 Critical tax
theory also does this by using non-traditional views and theories to
examine provisions frequently enacted in far different times by
people with world views not representative of all taxpayers back then
(let alone now). Thus, Zelenak's complaint that critical tax theorists
are overeager to accuse the tax laws of hostility to blacks and women
(as well as his third charge that they show "selection bias" in that
they pay no attention to tax provisions favorable to them) is strange.
Someone, Professor Zelenak for example, may want to write an
article that points out favorable provisions, but that is not the
purpose of critical tax theory. Moreover, unless all critical tax theory
claims that the entire tax code relentlessly affects women and
minorities adversely, the fact that there may be provisions favorable
to these groups does not discredit the value of articles that show how
some tax provisions hurt some women or some groups?
24. Id. at 1524.
25. See, e.g., HAROLD M. GROVES, TAX PHILOSOPHERS 24 (Donald Curran ed.,
1974) ("Taxation is an art and a technique as well as a science, and it always needs to be
judged against the conditions of time and place.").
26. See, e.g., Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 739,
773-86 (1995); Marc Linder, Eisenhower-EraMarxist-Confiscatory Taxation, 70 TUL. L.
REV. 905, 943-86 (1996); see also infranote 48 (citing my own work on the topic).
27. To my knowledge, all critical tax theory does not make this claim, but my
knowledge is limited. I did not even know that I was a critical tax theorist, and I have not
read all the articles Zelenak cites. Perhaps his statement is a reference to Professors
Moran and Whitford, whom he later cites for the statement that the Code is likely skewed
in favor of whites. See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1567. Zelenak's statement, however, is
broader than this. Moreover, even if that is what he intended, Moran and Whitford's
suggestion seems very possible since most other systems and institutions in any society
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Zelenak's choice of the word "hostile" is also interesting since it
implies personal animus. Critical tax theory, by its nature, explores
tax provisions that have sexist or racist effects, but these effects can
be adverse without being hostile in a personal sense. Sexism and
racism can be unintentional; they can be institutional rather than
individual, and the effect may be adverse at one point in time rather
than another. To describe critical tax theory as evidencing "hostility"
and "readiness to accuse Congress"' surely overstates the facts since
not all the literature Zelenak places within this category displays this
hostility. An analysis that describes negative effects is not necessarily
hostile, even if it may be unsettling because it shows a heretofore
hidden truth or problem.
As to the charge of "over-eagerness," most (if not all) writersincluding Zelenak-sometimes over-generalize or overstate their
case. This overeagerness may be true and more understandable for
writers in a new and developing field, including critical tax, because
they are struggling to define that field and to be heard. Sometimes
this leads to over-broad or somewhat inaccurate statements, and
Zelenak is right to point that out. Sometimes, however, Zelenak's
charges are themselves overeager and therefore wrong. His citation
of my article, for example, to illustrate his statement that other types
of feminism are ignored is irrelevant since I am merely using
difference feminism as an example of a philosophy that can support
progressivity. The existence of other types of feminism does not
cancel the existence of difference feminism or the fact that its beliefs
can logically lead to a support of progressivity.
II. FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE DIvERSITY WITHIN FEMINIST
THOUGHT

In his over-broad inclusion of all critical tax theory in this
reproach, Zelenak is guilty of his second accusation against the
critical tax theorists: failure to recognize the many strands of
feminist thought. This criticism also exists within the feminist
movement itself,29 and his use of it is a common technique to
tend to be weighted against the less powerful groups. Even if the tax system were neutral
on balance, there is still merit in examining individual provisions to see their effects on
different segments of the population. The prevalence of gender bias in the tax systems of
many countries is discussed in Janet G. Stotsky, Gender Bias in Tax Systems, 14 TAX
NOTES INT'L 1913 (1997). She does note, however, that a tax can be biased against males
as well as females. Id. at 1913-16.
28. Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1523.
29. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
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disparage or discount feminism. Yet the existence of many branches
of feminism does not negate the value of feminist tax scholarship

generally, nor the value of particular variants of feminism. Certainly,
feminist scholars should recognize differences among branches of

feminism where appropriate and be careful not to over-generalize to
all women when inappropriate. Sometimes, however, a broad brush
is useful since, as I have stated elsewhere, we all experience life

through a prism composed of many lenses such as gender, race, and
class.30 One person's particular combination of lenses will refract life

slightly differently than another person's set of lenses, but the
existence of a particular lens in any set will influence a person's range

on the spectrum. In other words, although each woman may have a
unique refraction due to her particular combination of lenses, the
gender lens creates certain similarities. Despite their differences, a
high income white woman and a middle income black woman (or vice
versa) have much in common vis-h-vis a male of either economic

class or race.
Furthermore, all feminist analysis need not discuss all types of
feminism just as a discussion of Greek philosophy, for example, may
focus on Aristotle but not Plato. A focus on one particular branch of
feminism has legitimate functions such as critiquing a current
position, serving as an example of an alternative mode of analysis, or
simply contributing to the marketplace of ideas. Moreover, in some

instances the different types of feminism may come to the same
conclusion even if for different reasons.
Finally, Zelenak himself understands and uses feminist theory
STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (criticizing much of feminist theory for presenting the

views of white, middle class women as the views of all women).
30. See Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 307 n.17. Many feminists reject gender
essentialism because they believe that womanhood is not biologically based but a societal
construct and thus there is no "inner nature to be discovered beneath the social
construction." Cain, supra note 6, at 28. It is unnecessary to decide whether the
commonalities I describe are biologically or socially determined. Similarly, this seems
true for the gender experiences that Cain refers to as the basis of gendered
misunderstanding.
The hiring decision illustrates how the broad brush of gender or race can influence
what we see and do. Many white men, for example, note the difficulty that white men
have getting jobs now that employers are concerned about diversity. Yet white men
continue to be statistically over-represented in most situations. See, e.g., Olsen, supra
note 7, at 939-40. Professor Olsen tells of a recent appointments committee at UCLA
Law School that had no women on it. See id. at 939. At a time when women represented
30-40% of law school classes, all the entry level candidates that the committee invited for
interviews were males. See id. Perhaps a more common illustration of the gender lens is
the common perception that a behavior performed by a male is assertive but the same
behavior performed by a female is aggressive (or "bitchy").
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strangely. For example, he claims that my article, The Rhetoric of the
Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction
("Income Tax Rhetoric")31 is a "proposal[] based on difference
feminism... for increased progressivity."3 In fact, the article is not a
proposal for anything, let alone increased progressive rates. Rather,
the article is primarily about rhetoric, as are many of my articles. 33
Specifically, the main themes of the article are: (1) that the neutralsounding language of economic efficiency frequently used to promote
a flat tax is rhetoric which masks an underlying philosophy; (2) that
there are other philosophies that can support progressivity; and (3)
that a loosely described web-of-care feminism, rooted in, but not
limited to, Carol Gilligan's writings is but one example of such a
philosophy. Income Tax Rhetoric could have conveyed the same
point by omitting the feminist discussion entirely and using another
example, communitarianism for instance.
Given the themes and content of Income Tax Rhetoric, Zelenak
makes several other incorrect criticisms of my use of feminism. For
example, he irrelevantly criticizes the article for ignoring branches of
feminism other than "difference feminism."'
This criticism is
meaningless since the article uses difference feminism only as an
example of a particular type of philosophy. He also mistakenly treats
Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women's Development 5 as a Bible that Income Tax Rhetoric (and
difference feminism) must interpret literally so that each statement it
makes must be found in her work. The theory, however, has grown
beyond Gilligan's original work and includes works of many other
31. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax
Movement A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 465 (1987). The short title is the
one given to the article by the Michigan Law Review and reflects the main theme of the
article.
32. Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1524 n.23.
Another example of Zelenak's
misunderstandings is his claim that I misread Carol Gilligan by moving from her
description of "what is" to a prescription of "what ought to be." Id. at 1551. On the
contrary, this move to "what ought to be" is made by Zelenak himself because he reads
Income Tax Rhetoric as a proposal rather than what it is-a description of a way of
viewing the world. Moreover, only two pages later he reverses his own reading of my
article and claims that "Komhauser's argument depends on the claim that it is based on
how women really are, not on... how they ought to be." Id. at 1552.
33. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes
Towards Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 166-68 (1994) [hereinafter
Kornhauser, The Morality of Money]; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rise of Rhetoric in
Income Tax Debate: An Example, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2345 (1996).
34. See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1523.
35. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
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36
writers, some of whom are cited in Income Tax Rhetoric.
Nevertheless, in a glaring example of his own selection bias (reproach
number three), Zelenak ignores these other citations, including later
statements by Gilligan herself.37

III. SELECTION BIAS IN ANALYSIS 38

Not only is Zelenak's charge of selection bias peculiar, as
described above, but he himself engages in repeated selection bias.
His continual reading of phrases hyper-literally and out of context
causes him to ignore what the author actually does say. This leads to
a sound bite interpretation of articles which ultimately distorts their
meanings. A basic example of this problem is his exclusive focus on
only the small portion (approximately one-sixth) of Income Tax
Rhetoric that discusses feminist theory. By reading this section out of
the context of the rest of the article, he misapprehends the purpose of
the article which in turn facilitates his other misunderstandings.3 9
36. See, e.g., MARY FIELD

BELENSKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING

25-51

(1986), cited in Kornhauser, supra note 31, at 508 n.140; NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A
FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATON 79-103 (1984), cited in

Kornhauser, supra note 31, at 509 n.145; Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist
Jurisprudence,95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1381 (1986), cited in Kornhauser, supra note 31, at 508
n.140.
37. See infra notes 44, 46, and accompanying text. Thus, to have a whole section on
"Kornhauser's Misreadings of Gilligan," see Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1551-53, reflects a
monumental misreading itself. It causes Zelenak, for example, to discredit my statements
about extended circles of care which include strangers because Gilligan does not speak of
them. Such a charge has no meaning since other feminists do talk of concentric circles of
care which include strangers. These feminists are appropriately cited in Income Tax
Rhetoric. See Kornhauser, supra note 31, at 510 n.148 (citing NODDINGS, supra note 36).
Noddings speaks of concentric circles of care, including the proximate stranger, and I
built on that idea to show that a progressive tax could be a non-intrusive, nonburdensome way to care for the non-proximate stranger as well.
38. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing selection bias in the
context of reproach number one).
39. For example, Zelenak states that my "feminist case for progression is based on a
particular use of tax revenues-providing the financial opportunity for self-fulfillment to
the poor." Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1554. He continues that this is a "rather romantic
view of governmental expenditures," since almost half the expenditures are for national
defense and interest on the national debt, about which the ethic of care says "[p]robably
nothing." Id Here Zelenak ignores my statement elsewhere in the article that how the
government obtains the revenue is not necessarily tied to how the government spends it.
See Kornhauser, supra note 31, at 473 (noting that a progressive tax, for example, can be
spent in a regressive manner). Zelenak then compounds his problem with his narrow and
literal interpretation of how one can help others by assuming that this assistance must
occur via a direct transfer to the other. As every tax professor knows, however, a
taxpayer may receive a real economic benefit by means of an indirect transfer. See, e.g.,
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729-30 (1929). Consider the
situation in which there are two taxpayers: B, a low income taxpayer, and C, a high
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Zelenak's treatment of Income Tax Rhetoric's discussion of who
uses a "feminine voice" also illustrates his non-contextual, hyperliteral reading and the resulting distortions of meaning. He states
that "[t]o Kornhauser, all females are necessarily feminist, and all
males are necessarily not feminist," and quotes a statement I wrote
about women seeing themselves and the world through different eyes
than men.40 He quotes accurately in the same sense that a movie
advertisement accurately excerpts from a critic's review. That is, the
words are literally accurate, but the meaning only tangentially so, if
at all. First of all, the statement is not necessarily a profession of my
beliefs, but part of my explanation of what difference feminists
believe.4 ' More importantly, Zelenak takes the statement out of the
context of this broader discussion. Like most discussions, this one
began with a general statement and then proceeded to refine it.
Thus, Income Tax Rhetoric later refines or modifies the sentence by
stating:
The "male" and "female" voices, of course, do not
belong exclusively to males and females, respectively. In
fact, by the time people are adults, most use both voices.
income taxpayer. Assume further that the government must raise $20,000 to pay for
some service that benefits all equally. (Zelenak ignores the possibility that national
defense and debt payments might benefit higher income taxpayers more than lower
income ones-a possibility I discuss in another part of Income Tax Rhetoric that he
ignores.) B would pay less under a progressive tax than a proportionate one. Surely, such
a progressive tax would benefit B and is an indirect way in which C can care for another.
Another example of Zelenak's selection bias is his focus only on a small portion
(approximately one-sixth) of Income Tax Rhetoric. This unduly narrow focus creates a
fundamental misapprehension of the article that causes many of his misunderstandings.
See, e.g., supra notes 32,37. In fact, it leads him to include the article in the feminist wing
of critical tax theory. In reality, it is not a critical tax article in the sense in which he and
many critical tax theorists seem to define the term-an article in which feminist or critical
theory is a central organizing force. For example, I was not invited to participate in either
the 1995 workshop on "Critical Tax Theory" at SUNY-Buffalo or the anthology Taxing
America edited by Karen B. Brown and Mary Louis Fellows that Zelenak mentions. See
Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1522 (citing TAXING AMERICA (Karen B. Brown & Mary
Louise Fellows eds., 1996)). It is interesting that many of the people who label me a
feminist scholar seem to be those who criticize feminist scholarship. See, e.g., William
Turnier et al., RedistributiveJusticeand CulturalFeminism, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1275, 1292
(1996). This brings up the issue of the value and purpose of labels.
Whether Income Tax Rhetoric is feminist scholarship at all is not clear, especially
since it is not clear what feminist scholarship is. That I believe in feminism, of whatever
sort, is irrelevant. An article written by a feminist is not necessarily feminist scholarship.
I discuss the article and feminist tax scholarship more generally in Kornhauser, supranote
5, at 303-09.
40. Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1550 (quoting Kornhauser, supra note 31, at 508).
41. As it so happens, I do feel that a person's view of the world is affected by many
factors, and gender is one of them. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Such a
confluence of beliefs, however, is not necessary.
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However, approximately seventy percent of those who use
both focus on one voice, using the other minimally. As their
labels imply, the female voice is predominantly the domain
of women and the male voice belongs to males.42
This passage is integral to the statement Zelenak quotes in his
text, but he acknowledges it in a mere note in which he admits only
that I "back[ off a little from [my] claim of universality."'43 "Back off
a little" is a curious description, but then the note is curious in other
respects. For example, Zelenak selectively reads the sentences in
Income Tax Rhetoric to get the result he wants, ignoring some so that
he can take the ones he wants out of context. The only sentence he
actually cites or quotes to reach the conclusion in his note is the last
one. He thus ignores important parts of what I say, and even more
curiously, ignores cites that Income Tax Rhetoric makes to Gilligan
(the writer I am accused of misreading). It is Gilligan herself who is
authority for the statement that although most people use both
voices, a large majority (about seventy percent of those who use both
voices) use one voice predominantly. 44 Shortly after this, Zelenak
once again ignores my statement that most adults use both voices to
claim that I overstate the gender difference, and that Gilligan sees a
difference of degree rather than kind.4 5 Here he disregards not only
what I say, but also what Gilligan has said, albeit not in In a Different
Voice. Gilligan is very clear that although each gender is familiar
with both voices, women largely use a "feminine voice," and this
affects how they define a problem, analyze it, and come to a
solution.4 6 Zelenak simply ignores this.
IV. PURPOSE OF SCHOLARSHIP

Zelenak's last and biggest reproach of critical tax theorists is that
many of them fail "to think through proposed solutions with
sufficient care .... It is unfair to criticize current law for its effects on
women or blacks without showing a way to do better;..."47 This

criticism reveals a far larger and more important failure by Zelenak
than any alleged failure by the critical theorists: his failure to
42. Kornhauser, supra note 31, at 511 (footnote omitted) (citing GILLIGAN, supra
note 35); see infra note 44 and accompanying text.
43. Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1550 n.148.
44. See Kornhauser, supra note 31, at 511 n.150 (citing remarks of Carol J. Gilligan in
Feminist Discourse,Moral Values and the Law-A Conversation,34 BuFF. L. REv. 11, 48
(1985) [hereinafter FeministDiscourse]).
45. See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1552-53.
46. FeministDiscourse,supra note 44, at 47-49.

47. Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1524.
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understand the nature of scholarship and the role of theory.
Certainly, one role of scholarship is to propose solutions to problems,
but it is not the only one. There are many other valid purposes of
scholarship, such as describing what actually exists, exploring
historical origins, and identifying problems. Consequently, a blanket
criticism that the scholarship fails to offer solutions indicates a far too
narrow view of scholarship.
When a proposed solution is the main purpose of an article, it
ought, as Zelenak notes, to be offered thoughtfully and with as much
care as possible. But what is a "proposed solution" and what is
"sufficient care"? As previously stated, Zelenak sometimes sees
proposed solutions when they are not there. Moreover, his
statements suggest that a solution has shown sufficient care only
when it entirely solves the problem. For example, he criticizes some
articles for not looking outside the tax code for solutions, 8 but this
shortcoming is true of many tax articles, not just critical tax articles,
because they are, after all, articles about tax. He criticizes other
articles, such as Professor Staudt's, because their proposals help some
women but not others. However, scholars in tax and other fields
frequently offer incomplete solutions. This occurrence is not
surprising. In a complicated, multi-cultural, multi-class, multi-raced,
multi-everything world, there are bound to be conflicts no matter
48. For example, Zelenak's incorrect view of Income Tax Rhetoric as a proposal, see
supra note 32, leads him to accuse me of "a sort of 'tax myopia' " by proposing a solution
with "minimal 'consideration" of whether the author's goal is best achieved through the
tax system rather than through non-tax legal reform. Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1524.
Since the article is not a proposal but a discussion of underlying philosophies that support
progressive and flat taxes, his statement makes no sense in regard to that article.
Moreover, his statement is somewhat ironic since I believe social policy generally ought
not be implemented through tax laws. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus
Reality: The PartnershipModel of Marriagein Family and Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REv.
1413,1435-36,1446, 1448 (1996).
Although I believe that it is desirable to implement social policy through non-tax
means, it is impossible to do so entirely since basic choices-such as what to tax and
how-inevitably reflect social, philosophical, and political beliefs. See supra note 25.
Indeed, a principal point of Income Tax Rhetoric,as well as much of my other scholarship,
is the inter-relatedness of tax and other elements of our society, such as history and
politics. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, CorporateRegulation and the Origins of the
Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 82-94 (1990); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section
1031: We Don't Need Another Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 397, 433-40 (1987); Kornhauser,
The Morality of Money, supra note 33, at 122-28, 132-66; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The
Origins of CapitalGains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do with It?, 39 SW. L.J. 869, 87174, 905-10 (1985). This long-standing theme in my scholarship makes Zelenak's
description of my work as myopic distinctly odd, especially since he is only suggesting
looking in other legal areas, whereas my work suggests that we must also look to nonlegal areas of society to understand legal problems and find their solutions.
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what the solution. One merit of critical tax scholarship is that it has
encouraged scholars and legislators to consider all these subgroups
instead of viewing taxpayers as a group undifferentiated except in
economic terms.
A primary virtue of critical tax theory is that it, like any outsider
theory, reveals the assumptions hidden behind established thought
and institutions. The very dominance of the established culture often
makes its assumptions invisible. People consequently tend to view
them as inevitable, objective, and true for all members of society, if
not at all times. Outsider theory helps strip away the dominant
culture's mask of objectivity and universality. Thus, Zelenak's
charge that critical tax theory contains an.unduly large amount of
"one-sided[] and incomplete analysis" which is due, in part, to its

failure to "approach the tax laws in a detached and disinterested
frame of mind" 9 displays a profound failure to understand the nature
of tax and of scholarship-a detached, disinterested frame of mind
may be a goal, but it is an illusory one. 0 The Looking Glass again
illustrates this point. When Alice complains that she has lost her
way, the Red Queen responds: "I don't know what you mean by your
way, ... all the ways ...belong to me."'" Similarly, the detached,
disinterested mindset Zelenak yearns for exists only for those who
believe that there is but one correct view, a universal Truth.
Regardless of whether such universality exists at the abstract level,
our current society has not achieved it.
What Zelenak describes as detached and disinterested is simply
the dominant mode of thinking whose ideas, assumptions, and
presumptions are so deeply embedded in the culture that they have
become transparent.5 2 In reality, people do not all have the same
view, and they cannot entirely shed their own subjectivity. Our lives
are multi-layered and so are our truths.
Zelenak's vision of detached and disinterested may be the
49. Zelenak, supranote 8, at 1578.
50. See, e.g., FeministDiscourse,supra note 44, at 49. As Carol Gilligan has said:

If you want to support what has been in the Western tradition since Plato-that
is, the notion of a unitary truth, that virtue is one, that its name is justice, that it
is part of the sense of one right answer upon which we all, in the end, can
agree-then you will select an all-male sample.
Id. Ann Scales says that the analysis of "what the facts are is too often taken for
granted." Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1,
23 (1992).
51. CARROLL, supranote 13, at 206.
52. Outsider scholarship such as critical tax theory unmasks these assumptions. As
Scales says: "Feminist Method unlocks objective reality and posits alternative claims to
truth.. . ." Scales, supra note 50, at 23.

1624

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

empirical study with its scientific approach, because science is
frequently viewed as the ultimate representative of Objective Truth
in our culture. He is certainly quick to discredit my theoretical
explanation of how feminism can support a progressive income tax
with an empirical study by William Turnier, Pamela Johnston
Conover, and David Lowery. Turnier et al. claim that their study
proves that cultural feminists, difference feminists in Zelenak's
terminology, show no statistically significant greater support for
progressivity than non-feminists.5 3 They then urge scholars to shift
their attention from feminist theory to empirical studies because "[tlo
allow theorists, regardless of their good intentions, to articulate their
version of the message of previously excluded voices is merely to
substitute a new form of dominance for an old one. It is far more
preferable to allow all excluded components to speak for
themselves."'54
There are, however, grave problems not only with the Turnier
poll results but also with their exaltation of empirical studies and
corresponding denigration of theory. As I have stated elsewhere,55
polls have inherent limitations that make them a poor method to
explore complicated ideas. For example, what questions are asked
and how they are phrased can lead to very different responses. The
Turnier poll in particular was deeply flawed by, among other things,
its use of self-identification as the method to identify who is a
feminist. This method is especially unreliable when the identifying
label is one to which many people attach such negative connotations
that they profess the beliefs but deny the label. 6 But even if this
particular poll were not so defective and polls in general were less
flawed, one must remember that science may look more detached
and disinterested because it uses numbers, but it does not necessarily
yield a more certain truth than other methods of inquiry.5 7 Anyone
53. See Turnier et al., supra note 39, at 1312. Professor Zelenak does note in a
footnote, however, that another recent study found otherwise. See Zelenak, supra note 8,
at 1551 n.155 (citing Michael L. Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, ProgressiveTaxation, Fairness
and Compliance, 16 L. & POL'Y 27,36 (1994)).
54. Turnier et al., supra note 39, at 1317-18.
55. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, What Do Women Want: Feminism and the
ProgressiveIncome Tax, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 151 (1997).
56. See, e.g., Thomas Petzinger, Jr., The FrontLines: Carol Latham Knows the Spoils
Go to Those Who Cross Boundaries,WALL ST. J., May 10, 1997, at B1 ("'I am not a
woman's libber and never will be,' ... 'I just wanted to be taken seriously.'" (quoting
Carol Latham, a scientist who felt patronized in a predominantly male field)). I always
thought that this was the essence of feminism that Latham is disclaiming.
57. Although statistical data may look more precise than "subjective" evaluations,
this is not always true. Most people can more readily agree on the "fact" that Rembrandt
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who has followed the capital gains debates knows that for every study

that shows how a cut in capital gains will produce increased revenues,
there is at least one other that proves the opposite. Frequently these
studies are based on very similar models with only slight changes in a
few assumptions.
Science is not the only Truth; it is but one of many truths. It is
not absolute but fallible, tentative, and evolving. 58 Science does not
operate separately and in isolation from society, but rather it is a part
of the social process. 59 As a consequence, concepts embedded in
society are also reflected in science. Thus, science is not detached
and disinterested, but like the society of which it is a part, it has a
point of view, and it can be racist, classist, and/or gendered.60
Since science, like other truths, is a partial and imperfect truth, it
would be unwise to abandon other techniques for searching for truths
is a great artist than on the "fact" that a capital gains reduction will help the economy.'
Recognizing this, the economist Deirdre McCloskey has said:
[E]ven if it were true that regression is more precise, this would not be a good
argument for economists to abandon introspection in economics. Introspections,
even if imprecise, can be better than regression estimates infected with
misspecifications and errors in the variables. That the regression uses numbers,
precise as they look, is irrelevant. To speak precisely, precision means low
variance of estimation; but if the estimate is greatly biased, it will tell precisely
nothing.
D. N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS 44-45 (1985). I cited this in Income
Tax Rhetoricten years ago and recently cited it again in connection with Turnier's poll. It
seems to need constant reiteration.
58. See id. at 32-34.
59. The investigation of science as part of the cultural and social science owes a large
debt to the seminal work by Thomas Kuhn. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCrURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
60. See, e.g., SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986)
(examining feminist critiques of science). Among other things, Harding questions the
alleged neutrality and objectivity of science. See id. at 34-35. First, she disputes the use of
physics as the paradigm of objective science since it differs from most sciences (such as
biology) in that it examines only "simple systems or simple aspects of complex systems"
that are separated from social constraints. Id. at 44-45. Even physics, however, cannot be
totally separated from the larger society. Long formulas produced and read by computers
are not explanations; the formulas are meaningless without interpretation. For example:
The formula "1 + 1 = 2" is meaningless unless we are told what is to count as a
case of 1, of +, of =, and so on. The history of chemistry can be understood in
part as the struggle to determine what should count as the l's, the +'s, and the
='s of chemical "addition." And it is not just in physics and chemistry that the
appropriate meanings and referents for such apparently obvious terms are
debated. As a famous physicist is alleged to have remarked, if we put one lion
and one rabbit in a cage, we rarely find two animals there one hour later!
Scientific formulas are like legal judgments: the laws become meaningful only
through learning (or deciding) how to apply them, and doing so is a process of
social interpretation.
Id- at 45.
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or even to privilege empirical studies over other methods, as Turnier
et al. suggest. Not only would it be unwise, but it would be61
impossible because empirical studies cannot exist without theory.
Without theory, empirical data is an unintelligible tangle of unrelated
bits. At every critical point theory influences empiricism-what to
study, how to study it, and how to interpret the results are all
influenced by theory. Empirical results can refine theory, which in
turn refines the empirical studies, and so on in a synergistic spiral that
brings us closer to an ever-changing truth. It is, therefore, impossible
to abandon theory, but it is also unwise to de-emphasize theory. To
do so would be like throwing out the baby with the bath water; to
neglect one part of the process is to thwart the whole. To use only
science, or some other "detached and disinterested" technique, is to
silence other viewpoints behind a mask of unanimity and
objectiveness. Not only is this oppressive, but it denies everybody of
the insights, knowledge, and possible solutions that the alternative
communities can provide.
Critical tax scholarship is valuable precisely because it helps
explode the myth of neutrality. Like any product of mortals,
however, it has flaws. Perhaps it may even have more than others
because it is still in its infancy. Professor Zelenak is right to point
these flaws out, but his criticisms overstep their rightful bounds.
Since critical tax theory challenges accepted views, mainstream
readers such as Zelenak must read with particular attention and
receptivity to new ideas. They must try to overcome the gender/race
misunderstanding. In other words, they must be willing to step
through the Looking Glass, suspend long-standing assumptions, and
view the world from a slightly different perspective. Critical tax
theory then will yield new insights. It may show us problems where
we did not see any before; it may produce some answers, but it may
not. Even if it produces only problems and no answers (what
Zelenak most complains about), it has provided a valuable service.
Contrary to Zelenak's implication, all scholarship need not (and
does not) produce solutions. Before a solution can be found, a
problem must be identified. Critical tax theory, like other outsider
theory, is especially good at identifying problems. By viewing the
world from a vantage point other than the established one, it lays
bare our assumptions and forces us to examine what we previously
took for granted. It thus reveals heretofore hidden problems. By
61. See ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 79 (2d ed. 1984) ("Perceivers
without concepts, as Kant almost said, are blind.").
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examining a topic from a new angle, it may also free people to seek
and find new and better solutions.62 A better solution may not be
possible; sometimes there is no way to solve one problem without
creating another. Yet critical tax theory's different perspective is still
useful. By revealing the multiplicity of viewpoints and problems, it
will have shown us that whatever solution we have chosen is only a
partial solution-that problems still exist (or that the solution itself
creates problems) and that we must search for other ways to
ameliorate those problems. It will remind us, as we must be
reminded, that our solutions are partial and evolving.
As more and more outsider scholars, such as critical tax scholars,
examine a subject, it may seem that only more problems are
produced-that shared assumptions that provide common
understanding are disintegrating and that we are descending into
chaos. In fact, the opposite is true. The problems always existed; we
just did not recognize them. The chaos of competing communities
and views has always been there, just held at bay by the dominance of
one viewpoint. Since such dominance is no longer possible or
desirable in our multi-cultural world, the only way to limit the chaos
is to create bridges of understanding among communities, to
encourage a process of compromise and balance so that all share
society's benefits and burdens. In the tax world, this approach means
that we must constantly be aware that the tax laws reflect social and
political choices, not just economic ones, and that all these choices
have different impacts on different groups. Our awareness of these
facts can help us deal with any resultant inequities either through the
tax code, through other laws or institutions, or simply by reminding
us that currently unsolvable inequities are present so that we must
remain tolerant and compassionate while we continue to seek
solutions. Critical tax theory is an important tool in achieving this
goal.

62. Gilligan illustrates the transformative nature of a discourse that includes both
male and female voices with an example of two four-year olds playing together but each
wanting to play a different game. The boy wants to play "pirates" and the girl
"neighbors." One solution to their dilemma would be for the children to alternate games:
10 minutes of pirates followed by 10 minutes of neighbors. Instead, at the girl's
suggestion, they played a new game: pirates who live next door to each other. See
Feminist Discourse,supra note 44, at 45. What holds true for moral discourse holds true
for tax: different voices and different viewpoints have the potential to transform the
discourse.

